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vs.
PARK-CRAIG-OLSON, INC., JSAMUEL PARK, and ELLIS
EDWARD CRAIG,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with the law firm of Suitter

Axland Armstrong & Hanson, counsel for Park-Craig-Olson, Inc.,
and J. Samuel Park, defendants in this action, and have personal
knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

I represented defendants Park-Craig-Olson, Inc.

and Park at the hearing on the plaintiff's renewed motion for
partial summary

judgment, which was held in Judge Moffat's

chambers on August 29, 1989, and at which an active dialogue
concerning the full range of issues before the court was conducted
between Judge Moffat and counsel to the parties.

No court re-

porter was present at the hearing.
3.

Although the bulk of the hearing was directed to

the plaintiff's motion to dismiss Park's counterclaim, the parties
also addressed the plaintiff's renewed motion for partial summary
judgment.
4.

At the hearing, and in accordance with paragraphs

19 and 20 of our Answer wherein we denied plaintiff's allegations
of apportioning co-guarantor liability by percentage of stock in
the obligor corporation, I argued that the court, in the event
it was inclined to grant plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss our Counterclaim, should require each of the three co-guarantors—Park,
Craig and Olson—to pay one-third of the corporation's obligations
rather than apportioning liability according to their respective
ownership interests in Park-Craig-Olson, Inc.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this 10

day of October, 1990.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
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INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, brought this action
seeking contribution from defendant J. Samuel Park and indemnity
from defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO") for amounts he
paid to First Security Bank (the "Bank") on a debt of PCO's that
he and Park had guaranteed.

The debt that Olson paid was only

a small part of PCO's obligations, most of which had been jointly
guaranteed by Park, Olson and defendant Ellis Edward Craig.
When it became apparent that PCO was in dire financial straits,
Park spent many hours of his own time and his own money in obtaining releases of the jointly guaranteed obligations and in
negotiating a sale of PCO's assets in order to save the individuals' investment in PCO.
Olson or Craig.

He did so without contribution from

When Olson sought contribution from Park for

the relatively small amount Olson had been required to pay, Park
asserted that he had a set-off, which he pled as a counterclaim
for unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
and granted Olson summary judgment against all defendants. Park
and PCO have filed this appeal.
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Park and PCO do not dispute most of Olson's Statement
of Facts. However, they do dispute Olson's assertion that Park's
actions in negotiating arid obtaining each of the releases directly

- 1 -

or indirectly benefited Park.1

Park obtained Olson's release as

a guarantor on the lease of the West Valley City store without
being released himself.

Park also negotiated the cancellation

of the sublease on the Arcadia store even though he had not guaranteed that sublease and thus was not personally liable for it.
There is no evidence that either of these actions benefited Park
in any way.
Park also disputes Olson's assertion that he was reimbursed by PCO. See Record ("R.") at 86 f 12. He was reimbursed
by Marie Callender Ventures, Inc. as part of the sale of PCO's
assets.

See R. at 141-42 f 3 & 182.

1

Although Park and PCO do not dispute certain other allegations, they are at a loss to understand their significance.
For example, Olson alleges that, when he filed his complaint,
the Bank had released its claims as against Park, Craig and PCO.
This fact would appear to be significant only in that it would
bar any subrogation claim Olson might have against the defendants.
If the Bank had no claim against the defendants, because it had
released all its claims, then Olson could acquire no such claim
when he stepped into the Bank's shoes.
Park also disputes the significance of the fact that
his counterclaim sought contribution from Olson for 16.67 percent
(not one-third) of Park's expenditures in trying to save PCO.
Park was only trying to give Olson the benefit of any doubt as
to the proper apportionment. Park was not so much interested
in obtaining a money judgment as he was in showing that he had
paid far more toward satisfying PCO's obligations than Olson
had, and 16.67 percent of Park's expenditures would virtually
offset Olson's claim for contribution.
- 2 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Olson first argued that this court should not consider
some of the defendants' arguments because they were not raised
below.

Not only were some of those arguments in fact raised

below, but, on the facts of this case, the court should exercise
its discretion to reach all of the defendants' arguments (point
I)Contrary to Olson's assertion, Park's counterclaim
stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment (point II).
Olson was not entitled to recover his attorney fees
from PCO because the only basis for a fee award that he has alleged, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415, does not apply to this case
(point III).
Finally, Olson was not entitled to summary judgment
against Park because Park had paid more than his share of the
jointly guaranteed debt and Olson had paid less than his share
(point IV).
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT CAN CONSIDER ALL OF THE APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS.
Olson argues that certain of the defendants' arguments
should not be considered because they were raised for the first
time on appeal. Specifically, Olson argues that the court should
not consider the defendants' arguments (1) that Park was not
- 3 -

liable for contribution because he had paid more than his share
of the debt, (2) that Olson was not entitled to contribution
because he had not paid more than his share, his share being
one-third of the total debt, (3) that the court erred in calculating the amount of contribution, and (4) that Olson was not
entitled to attorney fees incurred in the Bank's action because
he had not shown that he became a guarantor with the consent or
through the fault of PCO.
The defendants recognize that appellate courts generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

E.g., Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).

Contrary to Olson's assertion,

however, some of the issues were raised below.

The first issue

(regarding Park's reimbursement) was raised below.
86, 100, 197-98 & 218-19.

See R. at

The second issue (regarding Olson's

share of the debt) was also raised below.

In answer to Olson's

complaint, Park specifically averred that no right of contribution
in proportion to the individual shareholders' percentage interests
in PCO existed.

R. at 88-89 HI 19 & 20.

At oral argument on

Olson's renewed motion for summary judgment, counsel for Park
argued that the three co-guarantors should each be liable for
one-third of the total obligation rather than having their liability for contribution determined according to their respective
interests in PCO.

See Affidavit of Jeffrey Weston Shields J 4
- 4 -

(filed herewith).2

Thus, the trial court had an opportunity to

consider the issue of Olson's share of the jointly guaranteed
obligation,^ and this court should consider the issue on appeal.
Even if the first two issues were not raised below in
the terms in which they have been stated on appeal, broadly speaking, they were raised below.

The whole theme of Park's defense

in the trial court was that the court should consider the total
picture, which showed that Park had expended far more than his
share in time and money in rescuing PCO and saving the investment
of PCO's shareholders.

Therefore, Park argued, in equity he

should not be liable for contribution to Olson, who had refused
to contribute to Park's efforts yet who readily accepted the
benefits of Park's services.

Thus, the first two issues were

raised below, at least in general terms.

2

This court has recognized that an argument may be preserved for appeal if raised orally in a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment. Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). In Busch the parties did not
contend that the omitted arguments were raised below, nor was
there anything in the record to support that possibility. Id.
Mr. Shields' affidavit distinguishes this case from Busch.
3
The trial court granted Olson's renewed motion for
summary judgment based on the grounds found in Olson's original
motion. R. at 483. In his initial motion, Olson argued that
he was entitled to contribution from the co-guarantors according
to their respective interests in the corporation. Id. at 100.
Thus, at a minimum the trial court implicitly considered the
issue of the co-guarantors' proportionate shares of liability
and adopted Olson's position on that issue.
- 5 -

Even if the first two issues were not raised below, the
court should reach them for another reason.

The general rule

that an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal is subject to certain exceptions.

Speci-

fically, the rule does not apply when the issue concerns a party's
right to maintain the action. See, e.g., Blodaett v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (either party
or the court on its own may properly raise standing for the first
time on appeal); In re A.H. Robins Co., 681 P.2d 540, 542 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984) (accord); Mitchell v. Doe, 41 Wash. App. 846,
706 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1985) (the insufficiency of the facts to
support standing may be raised for the first time on appeal).
A guarantor's right to maintain an action for contribution against
a co-guarantor depends on whether or not the plaintiff has paid
more than his proportionate share of the debt and on whether
the defendant has paid less than his share.

See, e.g., Gardner

v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1984); Restatement of Security
§ 149 (1941); Restatement of Restitution S 85 & comment e (1936).
The first two issues—whether Park had paid his share of PCO's
debt and whether Olson had paid more than his share—go directly
to Olson's right to maintain this action and therefore can be
raised for the first time on appeal.
The fourth issue (Olson's entitlement to attorney fees
incurred in the Bank's action against the guarantors) was also
- 6 -

raised below.

The defendants argued that Olson had asserted no

basis for an award of attorney fees, R. at 533, although admittedly they did not make the specific argument that no attorney
fees could be awarded because there was no evidence that Olson
became a surety with the consent or because of the fault of PCO.
But then Olson did not argue that he was entitled to attorney
fees because he had become a surety through PCO's consent or
fault.

In fact, he did not allege any basis for an award of

his attorney fees except Utah Code Ann. § 7QA-3-415, which, at
best, entitles him to fees incurred in this action, not the Bank's
action.

As the party moving for a fee award, he had the burden

of establishing the basis for such an award.

Because he has

asserted no basis either below or on appeal for his fees incurred
in the Bank's action, this court can reverse that fee award without reaching the specific argument the defendants have made.
The defendants raised the argument on appeal only to show that
the only possible basis for a fee award, though not argued below,
was in fact not supported by the record.
The court should also consider the third issue, namely,
the proper computation of the judgment against Park.

The issue

merely requires a mathematical calculation, assuming all the
facts and law in Olson's favor.

Where, as here, a request for

or objection to a finding as to the amount of the judgment is
not required, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52, and the appellate court
- 7 -

can determine that an error has been made from the trial court's
computation in the record, the court can correct the error, even
if it was not raised below.

See Clarke's Trucking Co. v. Land

Mat. Servs., Inc., 278 Or. 153, 562 P.2d 976, 978 (1977).
Even if none of the defendants' arguments were raised
below, this court can still consider them.

The general rule

precluding appellate review of issues raised for the first time
on appeal is not based on any lack of power in the reviewing
court.
(1962).

See, e.g. , 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 545 at 30
The court, in its discretion, may decide a case on any

point that its proper disposition may require, even if it was
never raised either in the trial court or on appeal. See, e.g. ,
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987); Acton v.
J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.4 (Utah 1987); Romrell v. Zions
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). Accord Falk
v. Keene Corp. , 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974, 982 (1989); White
v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984).
Courts have considered various factors in deciding
whether to exercise their discretion to consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal. Those factors include the following: whether the issue affects a litigant's substantial rights,
Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 895,
896 (1987); whether failure to address the issue would propagate
plain error, Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc.,
- 8 -

787 P.2d 109, 115 (Alaska 1990); State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29,
35 (Utah), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); whether or not
the issue is dependent on any new or controverted facts or, on
the other hand, whether it presents only a legal question arising
on proven or admitted facts, 787 P.2d at 115; Fuiioka v. Kam,
55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973); Taco Bell v. City of Mission , 234 Kan. 879, 678 P.2d 133, 137 (1984); the extent to which
the arguments are related to the parties' trial court arguments
or could have been gleaned from the pleadings, 787 P.2d at 115;
and whether the parties have briefed the issue, Three Rivers
Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240, 243 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M.
57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). The
defendants submit that these factors justify this court's review
of all the issues raised on appeal, even if those issues were
not properly raised below.
An issue affects a parties' substantial rights if the
error was prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence the result would have been different.

See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35; State v.

Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989).

£f. Utah R. Civ. P.

61. The first two issues that Olson claims were not raised below
clearly affected the defendants' substantial rights because there
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the alleged errors, the
- 9 -

result would have been different.

Before a co-guarantor, such

as Olson, is entitled to contribution, he must show that he paid
more than his share of the debt guaranteed and that the defendant
paid less than his share. Neither was the case here. See Brief
of Appellants at 9-15.

Olson was therefore not entitled to con-

tribution, and but for the errors, the result would have been
different—no judgment would have been entered against Park.
Similarly, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result (specifically, the amount of the judgment) would have been
different if the court had considered issues 3 and 4. The amount
of the judgment against Park should have been some $25,000 less,
see Brief of Appellants at 15-17, and the judgment against PCO
should not have included Olson's attorney fees incurred in the
Bank's action.
Moreover, the errors raised by the first three issues
should have been obvious to the trial court.

The court could

not say that Olson had paid more than his share of the debt or
that Park had not paid his share without knowing what the total
debt was.
was.

Nowhere in the record did it say what the total debt

The Bank's complaint asked for judgment in the principal

amount of $226,189.51 plus interest. R. at 17. The record showed
that Park had paid the Bank $235,000. Id. at 248-49. This should
have virtually extinguished the debt to the Bank.

Thus, Olson

should not have been liable to the Bank, and he would have had
- 10 -

no claim for contribution or indemnity.

On the record before

it, it should have been obvious to the trial court either that
Olson was not entitled to contribution because the debt for which
he sought contribution had already been paid or that the record
was insufficient to establish Olson's right to contribution.^
See Brief of Appellant at 10.

Similarly, it should have been

plain to the trial court that the judgment against Park was too
high since the effect of the judgment was to relieve Olson from
liability for all but 4 percent of the total amount paid, well
below the 16.67 percent Olson claims was his fair share.
id. at 15-17.

See

Not to reach the issues that the defendants have

raised would propagate the trial court's plain error and deny
the defendants' substantial rights.
Third, the issues that Olson would like this court to
ignore do not depend on any new or controverted facts that would
require development in the trial court. How much the guarantors
paid is undisputed.

The first two issues—whether Park paid

less than his share and whether Olson paid more—present only
legal issues arising out of this undisputed fact.

With respect

to the defendants' claim that Park paid more than his share,

4

In fact, Olson's claims were based on three debts that
PCO owed the Bank, not just the two notes that the Bank sued
on. Only by aggregating the three debts could the trial court
determine the total debt and Park's and Olson's proportionate
shares thereof. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of
the third obligation.
- 11 -

the only issue is the relevance of the fact that Park was later
reimbursed.

With respect to the defendants' claim that Olson

paid less than his share, the only issue is whether the co-guarantors ' shares should be apportioned equally or in accordance with
their percentage of stock ownership in PCO.

Similarly, the de-

fendants ' argument that the trial court erred in calculating
the amount of contribution only requires a mathematical calculation based on undisputed figures.5
With respect to the fourth factor that courts consider
in exercising their discretion to reach issues not raised below,
the first and second issues the defendants have raised could
have been gleaned from the pleadings. It appeared from the pleadings that the Bank was owed $226,189.51 plus interest, R. at
17, and that Park had paid the Bank $235,000, R. at 248-49.
Thus, it appeared from the pleadings that Park had paid more
than his share of the debt and that any amounts Olson paid in
excess of his share were not owed to the Bank and thus could
not provide the basis for any claim for contribution.

At the

very least, it should have appeared from the pleadings that, if
Olson had a claim at all, the record was not sufficient to support
his claim.

Furthermore, the defendants' claim that the court

5
Olson's entitlement to attorney fees incurred in the
Bank's collection action also presents only a legal issue—whether
there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that Olson
became a guarantor with the consent or because of the fault of
PCO.
- 12 -

erred in calculating the amount of contribution could also have
been gleaned from the pleadings since the calculation was based
solely on figures contained in the pleadings.

The fourth issue

—whether there was sufficient evidence that Olson became a guarantor with the consent or because of the fault of PCO—could
also be gleaned from the pleadings because, on the motion for
summary judgment, the only evidence before the trial court was
that contained in the pleadings.
Finally, Olson has briefed issues 1, 2 and 4 regarding
the propriety of summary judgment against Park and the award of
attorney fees against PCO.

See Brief of Appellee at 14-19.

Thus, the court has the benefit of the parties' arguments on
those issues, making resolution of those issues appropriate.
II.
PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM STATED A CLAIM FOR
RELIEF IN QUANTUM MERUIT.
Park argued, both in the trial court and on appeal,
that his counterclaim stated a claim for relief under a theory
of quantum meruit, specifically one for unjust enrichment.

His

counterclaim could be dismissed for failure to state a claim
only if it appeared "to a certainty" that he "would be entitled
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of the claim."

Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Trans-

mission Serv., Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970).
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The Utah Court of Appeals has stated the elements of
a claim for unjust enrichment as follows: "(1) the defendant
received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make
it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying
for it." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Olson concedes that, at this stage of the proceedings,
Park's counterclaim meets the first element.

He disputes, how-

ever, the second two elements.
With respect to the second element—Olson's knowledge
or appreciation of the benefit conferred—Olson concedes that
"it may be appropriate to infer" from the facts Park has alleged
that Olson knew he was being released from his guaranties, but
he claims that it is "an unjustified leap of faith" to conclude
that he appreciated that the benefit was being conferred by Park
rather than PCO, the principal obligor.
12.

0 he of little faith.

Brief of Appellee at

All the allegations of the counter-

claim and of Park's affidavit, which the court was required to
accept as true and construe in the light most favorable to Park,**

See, e.g., Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d
622, 624 (Utah 1990); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d
1250, 1252 n.l (Utah 1980).
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indicate that Park personally set out to save the PCO enterprise,'
R. at 404 f 14; 247-48 II 11 & 12; that Park (not PCO) negotiated
the cancellation of or Olson's release from the guaranteed obligations, id. at 406 I 17 & 408 I 18; that Park (not PCO) sought
Olson's help but could not obtain it, id. at 405 I 15; that Olson
received the benefit of the releases from Park (not PCO) or
through Park's efforts and expenditure of funds, id. at 250 I
15 & 254 I 16; and that Park personally gave Olson consideration
far in excess of the amount Olson claimed in contribution, id.
at 250 I 15.

The only reasonable inference to be drawn from

these allegations is that Olson knew or should have known that
the benefit was conferred by Park, not PCO.

Even if one could

reasonably infer that the benefit was conferred by PCO, on Olson's
motion to dismiss the court was required to draw all reasonable
inferences in Park's favor.

Colman, 795 P.2d at 624; Arrow

Indus., 767 P.2d at 936; Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1252 n.l.
Olson next argues that it would not be unjust for him
to retain the benefit of Park's services without paying for them
because Park was acting for his own advantage and would have
furnished the services in any event.

The fact that Park may

have been motivated in part by his own interests and may have
benefited from his actions does not necessarily mean that he is
7

When Park first advanced funds to save PCO, in August
1987, he was not even a shareholder of PCO and thus could not
have been acting on PCO's behalf. See R. at 400 I 7 & 404 I 14.
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not entitled to restitution.

See, e.g., Restatement of Resti-

tution §§ 81, 103 & 112 (1937).

Section 112 of the Restatement

of Restitution states:
A person who without mistake, coercion or
request has unconditionally conferred a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was conferred
under circumstances making such action necessary for the protection of the interests of
the other or of third persons.
(Emphasis added.)

Contrary to Olson's assertion, Park's claim

comes within the exception and not within the rule stated in
section 112. Park's actions were necessary to prevent the loss
of PCO's assets. Because Park's actions were necessary to protect
the interests of Olson and Craig, the other PCO shareholders,
as well as his own, it would be unjust for Olson to retain the
benefit of Park's services without paying for them.8
Olson argues that Park has not stated a claim for unjust
enrichment because any benefit to him was "incidental" to services
that Park performed for his own advantage. This argument assumes
that Olson's release from liability as a guarantor on numerous
PCO obligations was simply a by-product of Park's efforts to
secure his own release. But Olson's release did not necessarily

8 Similarly, under section 103 of the Restatement, a person
is entitled to contribution if, in preventing the lawful taking
of his things, he discharges the duty of another in whole or in
part. In acting to prevent the lawful taking of his own assets
by PCO's creditors, Park discharged duties that Olson and Craig
owed as co-guarantors of PCO.
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follow from Park's release, as the transaction with the Bank
shows*

When Olson refused to cooperate with Park in resolving

the Bank's claims, Park negotiated a settlement with the Bank
that released all obligers except Olson.

Park could have left

Olson exposed to liability on the other jointly guaranteed obligations as well. Thus, Olson's release was not simply a by-product of Park's efforts to secure his own release and to negotiate
the sale of PCO.
Moreover, Olson ignores the fact that Park secured
Olson's release from contingent liability for two obligations
where Park received no corresponding benefit. First, Park secured
Olson's release from liability as a guarantor of the lease on
the West Valley City store even though the landlord required that
Park remain personally liable as guarantor on that lease. Second,
Park secured Olson's discharge from liability on his guaranty
of the Arcadia store sublease, even though Park was not a coguarantor of that lease and had no personal liability with respect
to that obligation.
Under the circumstances

of this case, where Park

expended large amounts of his own resources not only to save
the shareholders' investment in PCO but also to secure Olson's
release from contingent liability on numerous obligations for
which Park could have left him personally liable, it would be
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unjust to allow Olson to accept the benefits of Park's services,
as he has, without paying for them.9
III.
OLSON WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS
ATTORNEY FEES.
Olson was entitled to recover his attorney fees incurred
in the Bank's action against him only if he became a guarantor
with the consent or because of the fault of PCO.
of Restitution § 80 & comment d.

Restatement

Olson does not dispute this

principle. Brief of Appellee at 14. Moreover, he does not dispute that the record contains no direct evidence as to whether
or not Olson became a guarantor with the consent or through the
fault of PCO.

Rather, he argues that, under the facts of this

case, "it can hardly be argued that PCO did not know and agree
to Olson's becoming a surety." Although this may be a permissible
y

Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564
P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), which Olson relies on, is distinguishable
from this case. The court in that case simply held that, where
the plaintiff's performance of a contract with a third party
confers an incidental benefit on the defendant, who was not a
party to the contract, the third party's breach of contract,
without more, does not give rise to a claim against the defendant
for unjust enrichment. In this case, any benefit to Olson was
unrelated to Park's performance of any contract with another
and hence not merely incidental within the meaning of Commercial
Fixtures. Moreover, the only authority cited for the court's
holding in Commercial Fixtures—66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution and
Implied Contracts § 16 (1973)—appears to support the opposite
result in that case, leaving one court to say of the case that
,f
the dissent may well be considered more persuasive and impressive
than the views of the majority.•• Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co.,
713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986).
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inference on the facts of this case, on Olson's motion for summary
judgment PCO was entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn
in its favor, see, e.g., Pavne ex rel. Payne v. Mvers, 743 P.2d
186, 188 (Utah 1987), and it is at least reasonable to infer
from the absence of evidence that PCO was not responsible for
Olson becoming a guarantor.
More importantly, the burden was on Olson, as the moving
party, to show his entitlement to attorney fees, and he has offered no basis for an award of his fees incurred in the Bank's
action against him.1^
The defendants also argued, below and on appeal, see
R. at 533; Brief of Appellants at 28-30, that Olson was not entitled to his attorney fees incurred in this action. Olson argues
that section 3-415 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-3-415, entitles him to recover such fees. It states:
"An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated,
and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the
instrument against such party."

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(5).

Olson's argument ignores the clear language of the statute, which
defines an "accommodation party" as "one who signs the instrument
. • . for the purpose of lending his name to another party to
*0
The only basis for a fee award he has alleged is a
right of recourse on the Bank's notes, see infra, which provide
for an award of fees. But the notes would only entitle Olson
to fees incurred in an action to enforce the notes, that is, in
Olson's action against PCO, not the Bank's action against Olson.
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it."

Id. S 70A-3-415(l) (emphasis added).

It is undisputed

that Olson did not sign the instruments that he claims gave him
his right to attorney fees, namely, PCO's notes to the Bank.
Thus, he is not an "accommodation party," and is not entitled
to attorney fees under the statute.
Olson argues that, because guarantors are sureties,
they are also accommodation parties under section 3-415.

Brief

of Appellee at 15 (citing Kennedy v. Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d
881, 884 (Utah 1979), and Murray v. Pavne, 437 So.2d 47 (Miss.
1983)).

Although an accommodation party is a surety, not every

surety or guarantor is an accommodation party.

The guarantor

must have signed the promissory note, either as a maker or an
indorser, to be considered an "accommodation party" under the
UCC.

See U.C.C S 3-415 official comment II 1-2 & 4.

"A separate

guaranty agreement does not fall with the ambit of the Uniform
Commercial Code." Uniwest Mortgage Co. v. Dadecor Condominiums,
Inc. , 877 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord University Bank
& Trust Co. v. Dunton, 655 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1981).

The

notes in this case do not incorporate the guaranties,11 and the
guaranties make no reference to the notes but guaranty all of

11

Although the notes refer to "sureties" and "guarantors"
thereof, see Record at 19 & 22, "a descriptive 'reference' [to
a guaranty] is not the equivalent of substantive incorporation"
and does not bring the guaranty within the ambit of article 3
of the UCC. 877 F.2d at 434.
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PCO's indebtedness, present and future, up to $550,000, well in
excess of the amount of the two notes sued on.
The two cases that Olson relies on admittedly held that
guarantors who signed separate guaranty agreements were accommodation parties within the meaning of section 3-415.

However,

neither court expressly addressed the argument made here.

To

the extent that these cases hold that a guarantor who does not
sign the instrument can still be an accommodation party, they
are clearly contrary to the statutory language, to the scope of
article 3 and to the clear weight of authority.

See Uniwest,

877 F.2d at 434 and cases cited therein.
Because Olson has not cited to any other statute or
contract that entitles him to attorney fees, the trial court
erred in awarding him his attorney fees.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING OLSON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION.
Olson argues that he was entitled to contribution from
Park because Park had not paid his proportionate share of the
obligation, despite the fact that Park paid over 73 percent of
the total obligation, well over his alleged 54.33 percent share.
Olson argues that the court should ignore Park's payment because
he was later reimbursed as part of the sale of PCO's assets to
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Marie Callender Ventures, Inc.*2
the

proposition

that

Park's

Olson cites no authority for

substantial

payment

should be

ignored.13
The only effect that PCO's reimbursement of Park has
on the co-guarantors' respective rights of contribution in this
case is to cut off Park's right of contribution from Olson.
does not give Olson any right to contribution from Park.

It
Cf.

Restatement of Restitution § 85 & comment c:; Restatement of
Security § 154(4).
Olson argues that Park's position is nonsensical and
unfair because it would permit unfair manipulation of a corporation's finances by a controlling shareholder.

Obviously, if a

controlling shareholder were to abuse his position, the law would
1Z

Olson ignores the fact that the reimbursement came from
Marie Callender Ventures and not from PCO.
*3
Olson quotes comment e to Restatement of Security §
154, which says:
The amount of the proportionate shares for
which cosureties are liable among themselves
is affected by the extent to which the principal himself performs. This is true whether
the principal's partial performance is before
or after the surety's performance.
The obvious effect of comment e is to give the cosureties credit
for any payment that their principal makes to reduce the debt.
Here, the co-guarantors' liability was reduced by PCO's payments
to the Bank before it defaulted (just as Olson's liability was
reduced by Park's $235,000 payment). That is the only application
that comment e has in this case. After PCO defaulted, it did
not "perform" its obligation to the Bank.
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not be powerless to protect minority shareholders•

But that is

not this case.
On the other hand, Olson's position would punish Park
for voluntarily paying more than his share of the debt. Because
Park paid more than his share, he could have sought contribution
from Olson.

Instead, he sought reimbursement.

Had he not been

successful, Olson would not now be entitled to contribution.
But because Park was successful, Olson would now have Park pay
a second time and seek reimbursement a second time. And presumably, under Olson's theory, if Park were to pay 54.33 percent
of Olson's judgment and then be reimbursed again, Olson could
sue Park again for 54.33 percent of any amounts for which Olson
had still not been reimbursed, ad infinitum.

Where is the fair-

ness in this?
If there is any unfairness at all, it is only because
Park has been reimbursed and Olson has not. But that is a matter
between Olson and PCO, not between Olson and Park. The defendants
do not dispute that Olson has a good claim for indemnity against
PCO, as did Park. But the fact that Olson has not yet been indemnified should not negate the fact that Park paid more than his
share of the debt, precluding Olson's claim for contribution.
Olson also claims that he is entitled to contribution
because he has paid more than his share of the debt, his share
being based on his percentage of ownership in PCO. The defendants
- 23 -

concede that there is a split of authority on this issue and no
Utah precedent.

Olson states that M[t]he search is for a legal

presumption that will apply in most instances," and that the
better presumption is that co-guarantors of a corporate debt
have impliedly agreed to share the debt in the proportions of
their stock ownership at the time the guarantees are executed."
Brief of Appellee at 18 & 19. Apart from the fact that Olson's
position appears to be the minority rule, the presumption should
not apply in this case for several reasons.

First, the court

need not imply an agreement to share the debt in proportion to
the co-guarantors' stock ownership because the co-guarantors in
fact agreed to be equally liable for PCO's debt.

Each agreed

to be jointly and severally liable for PCO's indebtedness to
the Bank up to $550,000.

R. at 124-26.

Had they intended to

share the debt in proportion to their stock ownership, they would
have limited their liability accordingly.

The fact that they

did not shows that they intended to be equally liable.

See,

e.g., Curtis v. Cichon, 462 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
Moreover, a rule of equal contribution is more consistent with the nature of the guarantors' liability.

Park,

Craig and Olson agreed to be liable for PCO's indebtedness regardless of their status as shareholders in PCO. Their liability
arose from the guaranty agreements, not from their ownership of
- 24 -

PCOf and Park in fact remained personally liable on his guaranty
even after he sold his stock in PCO in January 1985•

From 1985

to September 1987, when he repossessed his shares in PCO, Park
received no benefits from PCO or from the obligations he had
guaranteed.

Thus, even if Olson were correct, on the facts of

this case the court should conclude that the presumption of unequal liability has been overcome and that each co-guarantor
was equally liable on PCO's notes to the Bank.

Absent proof

that Park benefited disproportionately from the Bank loans, the
co-obligers should be required to contribute equally as among
themselves.

Harris v. Handmacher, 185 111. App. 3d 1023, 542

N.E.2d 77, 80 (1989); 18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution § 22. Because
Olson did not pay more than one-third of the total debt to the
Bank, he was not entitled to contribution from Park.
CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial
court except to the extent that it grants Olson judgment against
PCO for the amount he paid to the Bank and should remand this
case to the district court for further proceedings.
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